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the court to be illegal were in effect, the Board determined that these
same rates were proper and should remain in effect. The Moss
decision and the events following it thus illustrate clearly that if
significant reforms are to be made in the administrative process,
efforts to achieve them must extend beyond the courts.'18
Compliance With A PA Requirements in FDA Rule Making
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Finch'0 the
United States District Court for Delaware held that regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Foods and Drugs for
determining the effectiveness of drugs had an immediate and
substantial impact on the pharmaceutical industry, requiring notice
and an opportunity for interested parties to comment before
adoption. In 1962, Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act to require drugs to be effective, as well as safe, and authorized the
Food and Drug Administration to refuse drug applications when there
was a "lack of substantial evidence" that a drug was effective for its
predicated use." 0 Substantial evidence was defined vaguely as
"adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations, by experts." '' In September, 1969, the Commissioner
issued regulations detailing the criteria for "adequate and well-
controlled clinical investigations" and restricting the testing
procedures which could be used to prove effectiveness."' The
Commission was already empowered by the 1962 amendments to
remove drugs from the market for lack of substantial evidence of
effectiveness. The September regulations further provided that when
the Commissioner promulgated regulations removing drugs from the
market, the affected drug companies could obtain a formal hearing
only by convincing the Commissioner that the efficacy of the drug in
question was supported by "adequate and well-controlled
investigations" of the kind described in the same regulations.13 When-
the regulations were made operative immediately upon publication in
the Federal Register,"4 the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
108. In this context it is interesting to observe that since the Moss decision the CAB has
established a new consumer advisory council, the function of which is to advise the Board on
questions of public interest. See Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1970, § F at 12, col. 1.
109. 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
110. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1964).
111. Id.
112. 34 Fed. Reg. 14596-97 (1969).
113. Id. at 14596.
114. 307 F. Supp. at 863.
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Association sought a preliminary injunction to restrain the
Commissioner from acting in reliance upon the regulations and from
applying them retroactively, contending that the regulations were
invalid because issued without notice and an opportunity for
comment in violation of sections 4(b) and 4(c) of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 15 In response, the Commissioner claimed the
regulations to be "interpretive," rather than "legislative," and
therefore within the exception to notice and hearing of section 4(b) of
the APA. 6 The Commissioner asserted that the regulations were
interpretive since they were the direct result of the substantial evidence
of effectiveness requirements of the 1962 amendments and merely
particularized an existing statutory standard. The court decided that
the Commissioner's characterization was not conclusive and that the
general policy considerations behind sections 4(b) and 4(c) compelled
notice and hearing to avoid undue hardship, regardless of the type of
regulation involved. In holding the September regulations invalid
because issued without notice and opportunity to comment, the court
did not rule on the validity of the regulations per se but granted a
preliminary injunction to allow the pharmaceutical companies an
opportunity to piesent their grievances to the FDA.
Section 4(b) of the APA exempts "interpretive" regulations from
the requirements of pre-adoption notice and opportunity for
comment;1 7 yet "interpretive" regulations are neither defined nor
distinguished from "legislative" regulations within the Act. The
Supreme Court has never attempted to articulate the differences
between the two types of regulations, despite controversies over their
meanings," 8 but lower courts frequently have so characterized
regulations and made the characterization a dispositive factor."'
Legislative regulations create law and are regulations which the
administrator is expressly empowered to make by statute. They
receive statutory force when promulgated, 1 0 for legislative regulations
115. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (Supp. V, 1970).
116. id. § 553(b), which states that: "Except when notice or hearing is required by statute,
this subsection shall not apply to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice. .. .
117. Id.
118. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
DAVIS].
119. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1964); American
President Lines, Ltd. v. FMC, 316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963); In re Chin Thloot Har Wong, 224
F. Supp. 155, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
120. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMIrrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1941); see,Davis, Administrative Rules-Interpreta.
tive, Legislative, and Retroactive. 57 YALE L.J. 919, 936 (1948).
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are often necessary to implement an existing statute. Because there is
a presumption that Congress delegated finality as to the substance of
legislative regulations to the agencies rather than to the courts,
reviewing courts are reluctant to overturn them.12' When a delegation
of power is explicit, courts find authority for an agency to promulgate
legislative regulations;122 otherwise, regulations are presumed to be
interpretive. Interpretive regulations-agency statements concerning
the meaning of existing statutes, legislative rules, other interpretive
regulations, and administrative decisions-do not propose new law
and are not entitled to statutory force. The validity of interpretive
regulations is subject to challenge in a judicial proceeding, 1 and they
often are invalid when issued without notice and a hearing. 2 4
Not only is the distinction between the two types of regulations
uncertain, but the relevance of the distinction to the issue of
reviewability is questionable. The assumption that legislative
regulations are not reviewable, while interpretive regulations are,
underlies the exemption from notice and hearing for interpretive
regulations embodied in section 4(b) of the APA. The rationale
behind the exemption seems to be that since judicial review will be
readily available for interpretive regulations and these regulations are
not legally binding, the principal remedy will lie with the courts rather
than with the agencies.2 5 The majority of courts, however, have
ignored the distinction when granting review,126 for review has been
denied even when regulations were interpretive. 2 The validity of a
regulation now rarely depends upon the type of regulation involved.
Since the Supreme Court has held that an agency is not the proper
party to define either its delegated power or the nature of the
regulations issued pursuant to that power,128 courts no longer defer to
121. DAVIS § 5.03, at 299.
122. See, e.g., Boynton v. Pedrick, 136 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), affd, 228 F.2d
745 (2d Cir. 1955).
123. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,
supra note 120, at 100.
124. See United States v. 353 Cases, 247 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 834
(1958).
125. See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946). The Senate Committee indulged
in this fictitious distinction of reviewability by describing "interpretive" rules as subject to
plenary review, whereas legislative rules involve a maximum of administrative discretion.
126. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); B.C. Morton
Int'l Corp. v. FDIC, 305 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1962).
127. American President Lines, Ltd. v. FMC, 316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963), criticized in
DAVIS § 5.03 (Supp. 1970); Helco Prods. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
128. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. Co., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944). See generally DAVIS
§ 5.05, at 317.
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the label placed upon a regulation by an agency.12  Practical
considerations, such as whether skills and knowledge particularly
unique to the agency rather then to the court are necessary for
formulating the regulation' 30 and the adverse effect of a regulation
upon a party seeking review,' 3' oftehi prevail over definitions. Yet, the
most important factor in upholding any type of regulation is the
amount of power granted to the administrator by Congress and the
degree to which the administrator may have exceeded this power.
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act has been regarded as an
outstanding example of a statute providing ample due process
safeguards. 3 2 Denials of hearings and lack of notice by the Food and
Drug Administration were unusual prior to the late 1960's.'" Inherent
in the 1938 Act was the importance of a hearing before regulations
could become effective,'3 and, although the Act imposed no real
limitation on the procedures used to issue guidelines and interpretive
regulations, explicit procedures were to be followed for the issuance of
legislative regulations. 3 - Sentiment for the rights of notice and
hearing abated in 1954, resulting in the enactment of the Hale
Amendment' 6 to alleviate procedural burdens for food standard
regulations by denying public hearings on noncontroversial
questions. 3 7 Despite the Hale Amendment, hearings were still granted
liberally, and the limited number of cases between 1954 and 1962
indicated that most controversies were being resolved through the
administrative process rather than through litigation. '3
129. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969); Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407,416 (1942). "The particular label placed upon it by the
Commission is not necessarily conclusive, for it is the substance of what the Commission has
purported to do and has done which is decisive." Id. at 416. See also National Motor Freight
Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90,95-97 (D.D.C. 1967); Seaboard World Airlines,
Inc. v. Gronouski, 230 F. Supp. 44,46 (D.D.C. 1964).
130. See, e.g., ICC v. Service Trucking Co., 186 F.2d 400,402 (3d Cir. 1951).
131. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963).
132. See DAVIS § 6.06.
133. But cf. Dyestuffs & Chems., Inc. v. Flemming, 271 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1960).
134. In its original form, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 701 (e), ch. 7, 52 Stat.
1040, 1055 (1938), provided: "The Secretary, on his own initiative or upon application of an
interested industry or substantial portion thereof, shall hold a public hearing upon a proposal to
issue, amend, or repeal any regulation .
135. Id.
136. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §§ 401, 701(e), 21 U.S.C. §§ 341, 371(e)
(1964), amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 341, 371(3) (1938).
137. S. REP. No. 1060, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954)..
138. See Certified Color Indus. Comm. v. Secretary, 283 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1960); Dyestuffs
& Chems., Inc. v. Flemming, 271 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1959); United States v. 353 Cases, 247 F.2d
473 (8th Cir. 1957).
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In the late 1950's, after an exhaustive investigation of the drug
industry by Senator Kefauver's subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly encouraged reform in the procedure for approving drugs, 39
Congress took notice of the dangers of unsafe and ineffective drugs
and began to formulate legislation to revise the procedures. The
Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 authorized the FDA, after
giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing, to withdraw approval
or deny an application for any drug if there was a lack of evidence that
the drug would have its represented effect. 140 The FDA then contracted
with the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council
(NAS-NRC) to review the effectiveness of both approved and new
drugs and promptly gave notice of this arrangement to the drug
industry.' Drug regulations were issued with greater frequency, but it
was not until Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner12 that the Supreme
Court acknowledged the procedural problems surrounding the
issuance of regulations by granting pre-enforcement review when the
adverse effect of a regulation upon a party was "sufficiently direct
and immediate." 14 3
The court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association followed
Abbott Laboratories by declining to make its own determination of
the interpretive or legislative nature of the Commissioner's
regulations and by adhering instead to the general purposes
underlying sections 4(b) and 4(c) of the APA. The court held that the
distinction between the two types of regulations did not determine the
applicability of sections 4(b) and 4(c), for the central objective of the
APA was to provide notice and an opportunity for comment in any
case where a proposed regulation would have a substantial impact
upon the regulated industry or an important class of the members or
the products of that industry. 4 4 By making the regulation effective
upon publication in the Federal Register, the Commissioner had
neither given the required general notice of proposed rule making nor
complied with the APA requirement of a thirty-day period for
139. See Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944, 946, 960-61 (6th Cir. 1970).
140. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1964), amending 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938). However, 21 U.S.C.
§ 357(0 requires persons objecting to the removal of certain antibiotics to file a petition stating
"reasonable grounds" for obtaining a hearing. If the Secretary decides "reasonable grounds"
for a hearing do not exist he can deny the petition.
141. 31 Fed. Reg. 9426 (1966).
142. 387 U.S. 136 (1967); see Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc., 387 U.S. 167 (1967). But
cf. Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
143. 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
144. 307 F. Supp. at 863.
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comment by interested parties before making the regulations
effective.4 5 The court attacked the substance of the regulations by
emphasizing the hardship that such a drastic departure from past
testing procedures would have on the drug industry. According to the
court, the regulations were pervasive enough to jeopardize more than
two thousand previously marketed drugs by making them subject to
immediate removal from the market if they did not meet the new
standards. Historical control, or the consensus of medical experience
and usage as an indicator of effectiveness, would be available only in
special circumstances, while exacting clinical investigations would be
preferred. 14 Such a change was considered patently unfair by the
court, for there had been no precise understanding as to proof of
effectiveness prior to the 1969 regulations. 47 The court believed that
under the new standards companies would not be able to employ the
additional research investigators needed to perform the required tests
since many trained clinicians would not be interested in testing drugs
which had already been marketed and accepted as effective by the
medical profession. The court also observed that the regulations
involved a fundamental public policy decision, for testing resources
are extremely scarce, and the regulations would require the
reallocation of these resources and their removal from the critical
areas of research and development. Therefore, the court concluded
that the Commissioner was obligated, both to the pharmaceutical
companies and to the public dependent upon drug research, to provide
notice and opportunity for comment before effectuating such
pervasive regulations.
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association should prompt the
FDA to implement the policies of fairness and compliance with due
process inherent in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and in
the APA when promulgating pervasive regulations directed at the
145. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(Supp. V, 1970).
146. 34 Fed Reg. 14596 (1969).
147. 307 F. Supp. at 865. The 1969 Regulations challenged in Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association were republished after interested parties had an opportunity to
comment. When, pursuant to the republished regulations, the Commissioner denied hearings on
the removal of drugs because of a lack of sufficient evidence of effectiveness, two companies
challenged the validity of the regulation.
In both cases, the court upheld the regulations stating that the Commissioner, pursuant to
his rule-making powers, could, after giving interested parties opportunity to comment, deny an
evidentiary hearing unless "reasonable grounds" therefore are first established. Upjohn Co. v.
Finch, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970); Pfizer, Inc. v. Richardson, 434TF.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1970).
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entire pharmaceutical industry.148 Although the FDA's primary
responsibility is the protection of the consumer,' the September
regulations questioned in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
would deprive not only the drug industry, but the public as well, of the
statutory right to comment and object to the substance of the
regulations. The FDA was required to remove ineffective drugs from
the market by the 1962 amendments; if notice and opportunity for
comment had been provided before the promulgation of the
September regulations, unnecessary litigation might have been
avoided and the designated drugs removed from the market much
sooner. When litigation occurs, testing by the NAS-NRC often
ceases, and the regulations are placed in abeyance pending the
outcome of litigation. Fair procedure in such cases can encourage
cooperation between the drug industry and the FDA, resulting in less
reluctance on the part of the drug manufacturers to comply with
subsequent drug regulations. Rule-making proceedings are not merely
confrontations between the FDA and the manufacturers but are
proceedings in which all interests should be considered, 5 such as the
interest of consumers in not paying substantially higher prices for
drugs to cover the companies' added expenses for what may be
unnecessary testing. Sections 4(b) and 4(c) of the APA were enacted
to ensure public participation in the rule-making process, for broader
participation enables agencies to educate themselves before
establishing procedures and rules which will have a substantial impact
on the public and on the industries regulated.' A denial of notice and
the opportunity to comment may facilitate the enforcement of agency
policy in the short-run, but it is the rule of law and the public interest
which eventually will suffer when procedural safegurards are
circumscribed.
IV. ADJUDICATION
The Evolving Right To Counsel In Social Security Hearings
In the past year a small, but perhaps important, change has
148. The obvious effect of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association can be observed in
the republishing of the September regulations in February, 1970, in full compliance with the
APA.
149. See United States v. Two Bags, 147 F.2d 123, 127 (6th Cir. 1945), which gives as the
purpose of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act the protection of the ultimate consumer.
150. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(3) (1964).
151. SeeTexaco, lnc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969).
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